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USING THE JULIAN ASSANGE 
DISPUTE TO ADDRESS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW’S FAILURE TO 
ADDRESS THE RIGHT OF DIPLOMATIC 
ASYLUM 
INTRODUCTION 
n November 20, 2010, an international arrest warrant 
was issued for WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who 
was wanted in Sweden for questioning on the charges of rape, 
sexual molestation, and unlawful coercion.1 Less than three 
weeks later, on December 8, 2010, Assange turned himself into 
the London, United Kingdom police, triggering a lengthy legal 
battle that played out in the English courts over the next 
eighteen months.2 The case seemingly drew to a conclusion in 
May 2012, when the U.K. Supreme Court determined that 
Sweden’s “extradition request had been ‘lawfully made.’”3 After 
a final bid to reopen his appeal was dismissed, U.K. officials 
were given ten days to remove Assange to Sweden.4 
Rather than exhaust his legal alternatives by pursuing an 
appeal with the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”),5 
                                                                                                             
 1. Timeline: Sexual Allegations Against Assange in Sweden, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11949341. 
 2. After Assange was granted bail in December 2010, both the Magis-
trates’ Court and the U.K. High Court ruled against him prior to the U.K. 
Supreme Court agreeing to review the case. Id. 
 3. Julian Assange Loses Extradition Appeal at Supreme Court, BBC 
NEWS (May 30, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18260914. Although 
Assange was not permitted to appeal directly to the U.K. Supreme Court, he 
won the right to petition directly to the court after judges ruled that “the case 
raised a question of general public importance.” Julian Assange Wins Right to 
Pursue Extradition Fight, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16027942. The U.K. Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Swedish prosecutor who issued the European Arrest Warrant 
(“EAW”) was a “judicial authority” within the broad meaning provided in the 
statutory language. Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2012] UKSC 
22 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 4. Supreme Court Dismisses Assange Appeal Bid, BBC NEWS (June 14, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18446295. 
 5. Id. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) is an international 
court established by the European Convention on Human Rights that rules 
on alleged “violations of the civil and political rights set out in the European 
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Assange sought refuge at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London 
in June 2012.6 Citing his well-founded fears of political perse-
cution and the possibility of the death penalty were he sent to 
the United States,7 Ecuador formally granted asylum to Assan-
ge on August 16, 2012.8 Sweden and the U.K. criticized Ecua-
dor’s controversial decision and vowed to prevent Assange from 
receiving safe passage out of the country.9 
                                                                                                             
Convention on Human Rights.” The Court in Brief, EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 6. Wikileaks’ Julian Assange Seeks Asylum in Ecuador Embassy, BBC 
NEWS (June 20, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18514726. 
 7. Article 1(A)(2) of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees defines “refugee” as any person that “owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the pro-
tection of that country.” United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees [CRSR] art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The Organiza-
tion of American States (“OAS”), of which Ecuador is a member, has formally 
recognized the “relevance and fundamental importance of the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Protocol, as the princi-
pal universal instruments for the protection of refugees.” Organization of 
American States [OAS], Protection of Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Return-
ees in the Americas, ¶ 1, Gen. Assemb. Res. 2232, OAS Doc. XXXVI-O/06 
(June 6, 2006), compiled in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH REGULAR 
SESSION 285, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXXVI-O.2 (Nov. 9, 2006). 
 8. William Neuman & Maggy Ayala, Ecuador Grants Asylum to Assange, 
Defying Britain, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/world/americas/ecuador-to-let-assange-
stay-in-its-embassy.html. Asylum is the “[p]rotection of usu. political refugees 
from arrest by a foreign jurisdiction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (9th ed. 
2009). A refugee is “[a] person who flees or is expelled from a country, esp. 
because of persecution, and seeks haven in another country.” Id. at 1394. The 
fundamental relation between the two terms is that a refugee seeks to be-
come an asylee by seeking asylum in a foreign state. 
 9. Julian Assange: Ecuador Grants Wikileaks Founder Asylum, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19281492 [hereinafter 
Ecuador Grants Wikileaks Founder Asylum]. In its defense, Ecuador alleged 
that numerous offers that would have allowed Swedish officials to question 
Assange at the Ecuadorean embassy were denied. Ecuador: Sweden Spurned 
Offer to Question Assange, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-08-01/assange-wikileaks-
ecuador/56669276/1. 
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Because Assange took refuge in Ecuador’s diplomatic mission 
and not within its formal territory, he was the recipient of the 
right of “diplomatic asylum.”10 This distinction is notable not 
only because Assange’s freedom of movement is limited, but 
also because political asylum and diplomatic asylum draw their 
support from different international treaties. In support of its 
position, Ecuador primarily relied on two treaties—the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the Or-
ganization of American States (“OAS”) Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man—as illustrative of basic human 
rights to which every individual is entitled.11 In addition, Ec-
uador relied on the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, 
which established the principle of diplomatic asylum in Latin 
America for instances when these fundamental human rights 
were threatened.12 Finally, when the U.K. allegedly threatened 
                                                                                                             
 10. The U.N. broadly defined this term in 1975 as “asylum granted by a 
State outside its territory, particularly in its diplomatic missions . . . in its 
consulates, on board its ships in the territorial waters of another State . . . 
and also on board its aircraft and of its military or para-military installations 
in foreign territory.” U.N. Secretary-General, Question of Diplomatic Asylum, 
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/10139 (Part II) (Sept. 22, 1975) [hereinafter Question of Dip-
lomatic Asylum]. This form is notably different than “territorial asylum” in 
that asylum is granted by a nation outside its borders. Id. 
 11. Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides 
that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, ¶ 14(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). Converse-
ly, Article XXVII of the OAS Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
states that “[e]very person has the right, in case of pursuit not resulting from 
ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accord-
ance with the laws of each country and with international agreements.” OAS, 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 27, 
OEA/Ser.L/V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS 
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 
OEA/Ser.L.V./11.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 17. 
 12. The Convention on Diplomatic Asylum is a multilateral treaty ratified 
in 1955 that bound many Latin American nations to the rules and regula-
tions surrounding the practice of diplomatic asylum. This convention notably 
recognizes “[a]sylum granted in legations to persons being sought for political 
reasons or for political offenses,” and defines legations as “any seat of a regu-
lar diplomatic mission . . . .” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, art. 1, Mar. 
28, 1954, O.A.S.T.S. No. 18, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Although each American nation 
is a formal member of the OAS via ratification of the OAS Charter, signato-
ries to the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum are limited to Latin American 
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to enter the Ecuadorian embassy and arrest Assange, Ecuador 
forbade entry by citing to another international treaty—The 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.13 
The U.K. remains steadfast in its desire to extradite Assange 
and provided two arguments in stating its opposition to Ecua-
dor’s involvement.14 First, the U.K. asserted that Ecuador is 
under a legal obligation to remove Assange to Sweden after the 
U.K. Supreme Court ruled that the European Arrest Warrant 
(“EAW”) against him, requiring his arrest and transfer to Swe-
den for prosecution,15 was enforceable.16 Second, the U.K. re-
fused to recognize “the principle of diplomatic asylum.”17 The 
                                                                                                             
countries. Compare Charter of the Organization of American States: General 
Information, DEP’T INT’L LAW, OAS, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-
41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States_sign.htm (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2013) (indicating that each American nation had signed the Charter 
by 1991), with Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, DEP’T 
INT’L LAW, OAS, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-46.html (last visit-
ed Oct. 10, 2013) (indicating that membership excluded nations such as the 
United States and Canada). 
 13. Damien Pearse, UK Threatened to Arrest Assange Inside Embassy, 
Says Ecuadorean Minister, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/aug/15/uk-arrest-julian-assange-
wikileaks-ecuador. Article 22(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations provides: “The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents 
of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the 
head of the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 22(1), 
Apr. 4, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 14. Ecuador Grants Wikileaks Founder Asylum, supra note 9. 
 15. The EAW, adopted in 2002, “is a judicial decision issued by a Member 
State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a 
requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal persecution or 
executing a custodial sentence or detention order.” Council Framework Deci-
sion of 13 June 2002, art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Council 
Framework Decision]. Once Sweden (the issuing authority) issued an inter-
national arrest warrant for Assange, the system triggered the U.K.’s obliga-
tion (as the executing judicial authority) to remove Assange to Sweden, since 
both nations are members of the EU. Countries, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2013). The EAW has no binding effect on Ecuador, since it is 
not a member of the EU. 
 16. Assange Loses Extradition Appeal, supra note 3. 
 17. U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague added that diplomatic asylum 
“is far from a universally accepted concept: the United Kingdom is not a par-
ty to any legal instruments which require us to recognise the grant of diplo-
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U.K. asserted that even for countries that do accept diplomatic 
asylum, it should not be granted “for the purposes of escaping 
the regular processes of the courts.”18 The U.K. claimed that 
Assange’s legal options had been exhausted by virtue of the 
fact that three separate courts in the U.K. ruled that the EAW 
was valid.19 Thus began a lengthy standoff, pitting Ecuador 
and the small number of countries that recognize diplomatic 
asylum against the U.K.20 Both sides maintain that interna-
tional law supports their respective positions.21 
When the right of political asylum was definitively recognized 
in 1948,22 most nations interpreted the right to cover instances 
of asylum granted to an individual by a nation within its bor-
ders, or “territorial asylum.”23 However, the lack of clarity of 
the scope of territorial asylum has led to significant uncertain-
ty about whether the right extends to individuals seeking 
asylee status from a diplomatic mission.24 In 1950, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”), in Asylum Case, indi-
cated that diplomatic asylum was not protected by internation-
                                                                                                             
matic asylum by a foreign embassy in this country.” Foreign Secretary State-
ment on Ecuadorian Government’s Decision to Offer Political Asylum to Jul-
ian Assange, GOV.UK (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=News&id=800710782 [hereinafter Foreign Secretary Statement]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Compare Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by South America, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19314618 (demon-
strating regional support for Ecuador’s position), with Hague Says Assange 
Rights Protected by Sweden, UK, EU, and International Law, MERCOPRESS 
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/09/04/hague-says-assange-
rights-protected-by-sweden-uk-eu-and-international-law (indicating that dip-
lomatic asylum is not necessary to protect Assange’s human rights). 
 21. Julian Assange: Ecuador Asylum Decision Criticized, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
17, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19292323. 
 22. See UDHR, supra note 11 (recognizing everybody’s “right to seek and 
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”). 
 23. Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 1. The U.N. specifical-
ly considered the right of territorial asylum when drafting Article 14 of the 
UDHR, despite efforts from various Latin American nations to include a pro-
vision that would extend this right to diplomatic asylum. Id. ¶ 192. 
 24. See id. (defining diplomatic asylum as being granted by “a State out-
side its territory, particularly in its diplomatic missions . . .”). 
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al law;25 however, it also intimated that diplomatic asylum may 
exist on an international scale as customary law if accepted by 
all parties.26 While the use of diplomatic asylum is concededly 
prevalent in nations that have explicitly recognized the princi-
ple,27 it is the noteworthy instances where diplomatic asylum 
has been granted by nations that purportedly do not recognize 
the concept28 that demonstrate its largely undefined role within 
customary international law. As it currently stands, nations 
such as Ecuador work within the margins of international law, 
quoting various multilateral treaties that allegedly support 
their position at the particular moment when diplomatic asy-
lum is granted.29 
This Note argues that the ICJ’s intervention is necessary to 
redefine the right of diplomatic asylum and to clarify the pro-
tection it is owed under international law. In its current form, 
the vague principle of diplomatic asylum is not protected by 
international law and should thus be redefined to address 
                                                                                                             
 25. See generally Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) (stating 
that diplomatic asylum was not protected by international law, but it may 
exist as customary law if accepted by all involved parties). 
 26. Id. at 277–78. 
 27. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶¶ 11–12, 155 
(“[T]he practice, especially prevalent in Latin American countries, of granting 
asylum in legations or embassies . . . had not been accepted by the majority of 
European States, and by the United Kingdom Government in particular.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Richard Allen Greene, Assange Embassy Gamble Follows 
Famous Precedents, CNN (June 21, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-
21/world/world_embassy-defections_1_wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-
vatican-embassy-ecuador (listing three cases where the United States grant-
ed asylum to those who sought refuge in their diplomatic missions). 
 29. In its official statement granting Assange diplomatic asylum, Ecuador 
cited sixteen legal instruments that provided the authority to grant Assange 
asylum. See Declaración del Gobierno de la República del Ecuador sobre lo 
solicitud de asilo de Julian Assange [Declaration of the Government of the 
Republic of Ecuador on the Asylum Application of Julian Assange], 
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD HUMANA [MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HUMAN MOBILITY: ECUADOR] (Aug. 18, 2012), 
http://cancilleria.gob.ec/declaracion-del-gobierno-de-la-republica-del-ecuador-
sobre-la-solicitud-de-asilo-de-julian-assange/ [hereinafter Declaración del 
Gobierno]. Amongst them were the Charter of the United Nations, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, the Geneva Convention of 1949, the Convention on Dip-
lomatic Asylum, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id. 
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modern concerns.30 An important part of this transformation is 
establishing specific guidelines as to how the right of diplomat-
ic asylum will be administered—specifically with regards to its 
scope within international law, the requisite conditions for 
when it may be granted, and its provisional nature. Such a res-
olution must also seek to address how the protection of regional 
interests is to be reconciled with the promotion of global coop-
eration. 
Part I of this Note provides background information on how 
the debate surrounding diplomatic asylum is framed within 
instruments of international law. Part II shows how geopoliti-
cal differences on whether the right to diplomatic asylum exists 
makes resolution of the Assange dispute under the current 
standard unlikely, and illustrates why enforcement of diplo-
matic asylum has been nearly impossible to administer inter-
nationally. Part III proposes three solutions—establishing the 
scope of diplomatic asylum, outlining specific conditions that 
are applied to all individuals requesting diplomatic asylum, 
and determining how it would be terminated if no resolution is 
reached after a period of time—and discusses how they should 
be achieved, consequently defining diplomatic asylum’s role 
within international law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
At its most fundamental level, the Assange case illustrates 
the conflicting viewpoints regarding the right of diplomatic asy-
lum and its basis in international law.31 However, the dispute 
                                                                                                             
 30. Asylum Case is the lone ruling by the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ” or “Court”) on the legitimacy of diplomatic asylum, and although the 
Court refused to recognize diplomatic asylum as a universal legal concept, the 
ruling permitted nations to regulate diplomatic asylum on a case-by-case ba-
sis. See Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 266. The ICJ advised the parties to resolve 
their dispute through negotiation, a resolution that is utilized to this day. 
Jovan Kurbalija, The Assange Asylum Case: Possible Solutions and Probable 
Consequences, DIPLOFOUNDATION (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/assange-asylum-case-possible-solutions-and-
probable-consequences. 
 31. These conflicting viewpoints are encapsulated in statements made by 
Ecuador and the U.K. in the weeks following Assange being granted diplo-
matic asylum. Ecuador defended its decision to grant diplomatic asylum by 
first discussing the potential dangers of extradition and then appealing for 
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also demonstrates that the debate surrounding diplomatic asy-
lum often involves case-specific legal issues not directly related 
to the right of asylum.32 While the contentious issue of diplo-
matic asylum in the Assange dispute has received the most in-
ternational attention, there are too many elements of this par-
ticular case for it to be cast only as a “diplomatic asylum” 
case.33 The complexity of the diplomatic asylum issue is often 
clouded by tensions between regional interests and global 
commitments, as is the case when it is allowed to flourish re-
gionally in the name of international human rights.34 While 
these incongruous responsibilities are often limited to a na-
tional scale, questions about the legitimacy of diplomatic asy-
                                                                                                             
international recognition by presenting various international agreements in 
support of its position. Id. The U.K.’s response made it clear that it finds it-
self under no legal obligation to recognize diplomatic asylum by any foreign 
embassy. Foreign Secretary Statement, supra note 17. To the contrary, the 
U.K.’s desire to extradite Assange results from a binding legal obligation that 
arises from its responsibilities to EU member states under the EAW system. 
See Foreign Secretary Statement, supra note 17; Council Framework Decision, 
supra note 15, art. 31(1) (indicating that the EAW “replace[s] the correspond-
ing provisions of the . . . conventions applicable in the field of extradition in 
relations between the Member States”). 
 32. Factors to consider in the context of a diplomatic asylum case may in-
clude, but are not limited to: the relationship between the interested nations, 
the crime for which the individual is sought, and the length of time for which 
the individual has been pursued. 
 33. The Assange case specifically brings into question the applicability of 
diplomatic asylum in cases where an individual faces impending political 
persecution and the death penalty, as Ecuador alleges Assange would face if 
surrendered to Swedish authorities. Neuman & Ayala, supra note 8. The 
EAW system raises separate questions about whether extradition to another 
member country is appropriate if the allegations made by the issuing country 
do not constitute a crime in the executing country. Although English courts 
twice rejected Assange’s specific contention that the allegations would not 
have constituted rape in the U.K., the issue remains largely unresolved. Da-
vid Allen Green, Legal Myths about the Assange Extradition, NEWSTATESMAN 
BLOG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allen-
green/2012/08/legal-myths-about-assange-extradition. 
 34. These obligations may be legal or nonlegal. Legal obligations between 
nations, such as extradition, are often dictated by treaties and typically have 
a limited scope. Nonlegal obligations, such as foreign relations, exist on a 
larger scale and often have an indeterminate scope. 
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lum result in a difficult analysis when issues of preexisting 
commitments between countries arise.35 
A. Extradition and the European Arrest Warrant 
In a typical diplomatic asylum case, the individual seeking 
asylee status often stands accused of crimes perpetrated in the 
nation seeking the individual’s apprehension. It stands to rea-
son that the nation seeking apprehension would request coop-
eration from other nations to assist in the individual’s capture. 
In this manner, one legal issue that is not specific to the 
Assange dispute is the widely recognized international obliga-
tion known as the extradition process.36 The practice of extradi-
tion originated in early civilizations, but has seen its scope ex-
pand as “[g]lobalization has brought about increased mobility 
for persons across national borders, greater opportunities for 
transnational crimes, and significantly more knowledge about 
international crimes.”37 Despite its increased acceptance, it is 
commonly understood that there is no general obligation for a 
state to extradite an individual to a foreign government.38 
As a result, extradition finds its legal basis almost exclusively 
in a vast number of bilateral and multilateral treaties. Most 
common law countries require formal treaties with respect to 
extradition, including the United States and the U.K.39 As of 
October 2011, the United States was a party to 114 bilateral 
                                                                                                             
 35. These international obligations may be outlined in near-universally 
recognized pieces of international law, such as documents adopted by the 
U.N. or multilateral treaties between nations. 
 36. Extradition is defined as “[t]he official surrender of an alleged criminal 
by one state or nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 665. 
 37. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES 
LAW AND PRACTICE 34 (4th ed. 2002). 
 38. An increasing number of states may now be engaged in extradition due 
to their perceived “need for increased international cooperation” as a result of 
recent international developments such as globalization and terrorism. Id. at 
xi–xii. Although one line of thinking holds that an affirmative legal duty does 
have a basis in international law, this view is adopted only “with respect to 
international crimes.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 36. Contrary to common law countries, civil law countries typi-
cally do not observe formal obligations and instead grant extradition “on the 
basis of reciprocity or comity.” Id. 
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extradition treaties as well as the Multilateral Convention on 
Extradition.40 Though beneficial to a certain extent, the lack of 
international uniformity regarding the rules of extradition can 
pose significant problems with respect to enforcement and 
compliance.41 In addition, a consequence of exclusive reliance 
on bilateral extradition treaties is that it necessitates “a bur-
densome practice of treaty-making.”42 The result of this contin-
uously evolving system of regulation is that the extradition 
process is more efficient between “states which have closer po-
litical relations and similar legal systems.”43 
While some nations have expressed a reluctance to engage in 
extradition, based in part on national sovereignty concerns, the 
process is generally recognized as necessary to facilitate the 
prosecution of both domestic and international crimes.44 Due to 
its importance, adherence to the treaties that make up extradi-
tion law is the primary means by which nations can enhance 
international cooperation.45 The international community sup-
plements this piecemeal approach by imposing an affirmative 
                                                                                                             
 40. See 1 WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES, UNITED 
STATES v–ix (2011). The United States is also a party to a number of multilat-
eral treaties relating to extradition, namely aviation, genocide, narcotic 
drugs, terrorism, and torture. See 2 WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., EXTRADITION 
LAWS AND TREATIES, UNITED STATES 1150.1–1150.36 (2011). 
 41. One benefit to such a structure is “more detailed laws and more effec-
tive administration and judicial procedures,” which often result in “a tenden-
cy to facilitate extradition.” BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at xii. The process also 
allows nations to condition their compliance on certain issues, such as the 
possibility of certain forms of punishment, the political nature of the alleged 
crime, and jurisdiction. In this manner, national legislation and specifically-
tailored extradition treaties provide a legitimate and effective means by 
which nations can protect their sovereignty or any other values they believe 
are worth protecting within the context of international law. 
 42. Id. at 86. The lack of uniformity may also mean newcomers to the pro-
cess are “less forthcoming as well as less effective in their extradition practic-
es,” as well as more reluctant to turn their back on national sovereignty. Id. 
at xii. 
 43. Id. at xii. 
 44. Bassiouni describes many developing countries as having “a residue of 
sensitivity with respect to their national sovereignty,” although he notes that 
such concerns are slowly disintegrating. Id. He also notes that the develop-
ment of the bilateral system was based partly on the preference of developing 
nations to emphasize their sovereignty. Id. at 46. 
 45. Id. at xii. 
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legal obligation to extradite individuals alleged to have partici-
pated in certain international crimes.46 However, in an effort to 
create a more effective and transparent system on a smaller 
scale, some regions have undertaken to improve the extradition 
process by effectively replacing the treaty-based system with a 
system based on more explicit legal obligations.47 
A notable instance of a region that has made extraordinary 
efforts to supplement bilateral treaties on extradition and im-
prove coordination between member states is the European 
Union.48 Prior to 2001, the EU had a treaty on extradition in 
place that exceeded what was required of it under international 
law.49 Despite this, the EU felt increasing pressure to improve 
cooperation between member states following the terrorist at-
tacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 
2001.50 The primary result of the EU’s renewed interest was 
the adoption of the EAW in 2002, which replaced the extradi-
tion system in place at the time.51 The principle of “mutual 
recognition,” which allows for the harmonization between the 
                                                                                                             
 46. Bassiouni lists twenty types of multilateral conventions that establish 
the duty to extradite, including, but not limited to war, apartheid, torture, 
slavery, and genocide. Id. at 913–24. 
 47. Multilateral Regional Arrangements are often the by-products of such 
efforts and serve as “a mechanism to harmonize legal systems, if not unify 
them with respect to the practice.” Id. at 42. 
 48. These efforts are possibly the result of the EU’s desire “to harmonize 
policies among its members in the area of ‘justice and home affairs.’” KRISTIN 
ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RS22030, U.S.-EU 
COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM 1 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 49. The European Convention on Extradition was a multilateral treaty 
instituted in 1960 between member states that intended to regulate extradi-
tion by creating affirmative legal obligations between nations for certain 
crimes. Council of Europe, European Convention on Extradition, opened for 
signature Dec. 13, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24. 
 50. This concern was based partly on the fact that “at the time of the 2001 
attacks, most EU member states lacked anti-terrorist legislation, or even a 
legal definition of terrorism.” ARCHICK, supra note 48. The situation was ag-
gravated by the fact that the EU had “largely open borders and . . . different 
legal systems [which] enabled some terrorists and other criminals to move 
around easily and evade arrest and prosecution.” Id. 
 51. Article 31(1) provides that “this Framework Decision shall . . . replace 
the corresponding provisions of the . . . conventions applicable in the field of 
extradition in relations between the Member States.” Council Framework 
Decision, supra note 15, art. 31(1). 
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member states in the absence of national legislation,52 was also 
introduced to the new legislation.53 Expansion of this widely 
observed economic principle into transnational criminal law, 
along with the undeniable purpose of the decision to both har-
monize and expand extradition obligations through the EAW, 
demonstrates that national sovereignty has taken a back seat 
to “police and judicial cooperation” between member states.54 
B. Instruments of International Law 
While the EAW provides useful guidelines on extradition for 
EU member states, its scope is limited by international law.55 
The EU has authority over its member states, but each mem-
ber state also has responsibilities as a result of their member-
ship in the U.N.56 For the instances in which conflicting obliga-
tions exist, the U.N. Charter states that responsibilities to the 
U.N. shall take precedence over “any other international 
                                                                                                             
 52. Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment—Mutual Recognition in the Context of the Follow-up to the Action Plan 
for the Single Market, at 3, COM (1999) 299 final (June 16, 1999). 
 53. “Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the 
basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provi-
sions of the framework decision.” Council Framework Decision, supra note 
15, art. 1(2) (emphasis added). The EU described the new system as “the first 
concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the principle of 
mutual recognition which the European Council referred to as the corner-
stone of judicial cooperation.” Id. ¶ 6. 
 54. Although the EU describes itself as “a unique economic and political 
partnership . . . ,” Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 
18, 2013), this cooperation in the legal arena falls under the broad “justice 
and home affairs” umbrella, which encompasses various policies that are nei-
ther political nor economic. ARCHICK, supra note 48. 
 55. Article 21 is specifically entitled “Competing international obligations,” 
and outlines the responsibilities of nations in various circumstances where 
this issue may arise. Id. art. 21. 
 56. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, 
was signed by the members of the former European Community and formally 
created the EU. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992, 
1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. This treaty has since been amended to reflect both the 
increased role of the EU and its new membership. Treaty of Maastricht on 
European Union, EUROPA: SUMMARIES OF LEGISLATION (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_
maastricht_en.htm. 
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agreement.”57 The U.N. lays out clearly defined consequences 
for violating this supremacy, emphasizing the importance of its 
involvement in resolving diplomatic asylum disputes.58 Howev-
er, issues of supremacy arise in instances where multilateral 
agreements that potentially conflict with other international 
treaties cause nations to disagree about the extent of their re-
sponsibilities under international law. With regard to the U.N. 
specifically, various international agreements continue to have 
a noteworthy impact on the treatment of refugees and asylees, 
especially those residing in diplomatic premises. 
Assange’s indefinite stay in the Ecuadorian diplomatic prem-
ises creates a significant hurdle for any party attempting to 
capture him against his will. The Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations places significant limitations on the ability of 
the U.K. to honor the EAW issued by Sweden. It is a funda-
mental premise of diplomatic law that “[t]he premises of the 
mission shall be inviolable[] [and that] [t]he agents of the re-
ceiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of 
the head of the mission.”59 Although Assange has taken refuge 
inside a place that is physically accessible to the relevant au-
thorities, the U.K. is left with no means of apprehending 
Assange until he leaves the embassy.60 Failure to observe this 
clearly-defined limitation would have a drastic effect on the re-
lationship between the U.K. and Ecuador and on diplomatic 
relations around the world.61 Therefore, international law of-
                                                                                                             
 57. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (obligations under the U.N. Charter prevail 
over “obligations under any other international agreement”); Council Frame-
work Decision, supra note 15, art. 21. 
 58. See U.N. Charter art. 6 (“A member of the United Nations which has 
persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be 
expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recom-
mendation of the Security Council.”). 
 59. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 13, art. 22. 
 60. The U.K. has gone so far as to allegedly bring into question the invio-
lability of the Ecuadorian embassy in London, but eventually retreated from 
this position. Pearse, supra note 13. 
 61. Although the relationship between Ecuador and the U.K. may be irre-
trievably broken based on the threats exchanged between the countries, Ec-
uador is currently the sole recipient of the lucrative Andean Trade Prefer-
ences from the United States, which provide preferential tariff treatment for 
certain products. Nicholas Kozloff, Ecuador Comes Out Winner as UK Over-
reaches with Assange Threats on Likely Behalf of US, BUZZFLASH (Aug. 19, 
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fers near limitless protection to Assange as long as he stays 
within Ecuador’s embassy.62 
Ecuador’s status as a member of the OAS poses another prob-
lem for the U.K., one that was first recognized by the U.N. in 
1975.63 The root of diplomatic asylum is traced back to Europe 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when ambassadors 
in newly-designated permanent missions were provided with 
inviolability of their dwellings to supplement “the personal in-
violability that he had traditionally enjoyed in order to remove 
him from the influence of the receiving State.”64 However, by 
the time the principle had all but disappeared in nineteenth 
century Europe, it had been earnestly adopted and frequently 
utilized in Latin American countries.65 Following the ratifica-
tion of the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum by Latin 
American countries in 1954, some scholars even went so far as 
to argue that the UDHR provided that diplomatic asylum is a 
human right.66 Although the U.N. report on the Question of 
Diplomatic Asylum was published more than forty years ago, 
                                                                                                             
2012), http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/item/11685-ecuador-
comes-out-winner-as-uk-overreaches-with-assange-threats-on-likely-behalf-
of-us. Ecuador may find its trade benefits terminated or reduced when the 
preferences go up for renewal, as its preferential status was already unset-
tled as the result of another dispute that put pressure on relations between 
Ecuador and the U.K. As some commentators have noted, Ecuador’s role in 
the Assange affair “was not ‘a move destined to win many new friends in 
Washington.’” Id. 
 62. The Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act does offer a legal basis for 
withdrawing recognition of diplomatic status under certain circumstances. 
Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act, 1987, c. 46, § 1(3), (Eng.). However, 
withdrawing such a status must be “permissible under international law,” a 
highly disputed proposition that does not unequivocally support the U.K.’s 
position. Id. § 1(4). 
 63. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 (discussing 
the history and growth of diplomatic asylum, most notably in Latin America). 
 64. Id. ¶ 2. Shortly thereafter, “ambassadors acquired the habit of receiv-
ing persons sought by the authorities of the territorial State.” Id. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The report indicated that many Latin American nations 
gained independence around this time, and the growth of diplomatic asylum 
likely came as a natural result. Id. ¶ 11. 
 66. Id. ¶ 297. 
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the reality that diplomatic asylum is viewed differently in Lat-
in America than it is internationally has not changed.67 
International law stands at the heart of these dissonant 
views on diplomatic asylum. The supremacy of the U.N. as an 
organization, the scope and binding nature of its various 
agreements, and its vast membership make the U.N. the only 
international body that can decisively determine whether the 
granting of diplomatic asylum was appropriate in the case of 
Julian Assange.68 While there are ultimately a number of dif-
ferent manners by which the U.N. could address the issue, the 
ICJ, as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” 69 is 
the most appropriate body to resolve such a dispute. 
C. The Influence of the International Court of Justice 
The importance of the ICJ’s role in resolving diplomatic asy-
lum disputes is based on two important factors. First, the 
Court’s self-defined role is specifically tailored to hear the dis-
pute between Ecuador and the U.K.70 Individuals are not per-
mitted to appear in front of the Court as “[o]nly States may be 
                                                                                                             
 67. See Jovan Kurbalija, Frequently Asked Questions about Diplomatic 
Asylum, DIPLOFOUNDATION (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/frequently-asked-questions-about-diplomatic-
asylum (“While it is not globally accepted as a legal concept, diplomatic asy-
lum exists as regional law in Latin America”); Julian Assange Row: Ecuador 
Backed by South America, supra note 20. 
 68. Of the sixteen legal instruments Ecuador provided as the basis for 
granting Assange asylum, five of them were either U.N. documents or re-
quired U.N. enforcement. Declaración del Gobierno, supra note 29. These are 
the U.N. Charter, UDHR, Geneva Convention, CRSR, and Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. Id. 
 69. U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 70. The Court has broad jurisdiction over “all legal disputes concerning: a. 
the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; the exist-
ence of any fact which . . . would constitute a breach of an international obli-
gation; d. the . . . reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. The Court is 
also able to “give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of 
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations to make such a request.” Id. art. 65(1). 
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parties in cases before the Court.”71 Further, these states must 
be a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.72 
Most importantly, the judgments of the Court are binding on 
all concerned parties, final, and non-appealable.73 The strict 
guidelines of the ICJ provide the ideal forum to not only resolve 
the Assange dispute, but to also examine the validity of diplo-
matic asylum in general.74 The four other principle organs are 
ill-equipped to resolve disputes on international law because 
such disputes fall outside their intended responsibilities and 
are thus not intended to resolve conflicts of this magnitude.75 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. art. 34(1). This procedural exclusivity ensures that the Court hears 
only those cases deemed sufficiently important for sovereign governments to 
pursue, and not those pertaining to private parties. In this respect, the ICJ is 
unique from each of the other three international courts (European Court of 
Justice, ECHR, and Inter-American Court of Human Rights), which are able 
to consider claims brought by individuals. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L 
COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ), http://www.icj-
cij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2 (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). Fur-
ther, the Court is not permitted to “deal with a dispute of its motion” and 
“can only hear a dispute when requested to do so by one or more States.” Id. 
 72. See U.N. Charter art. 93 (indicating that “[a]ll members of the United 
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice,” but also providing non-U.N. members with a means by which they can 
become a party to the ICJ Statute). 
 73. “The judgment is final and without appeal.” ICJ Statute, supra note 
70, art. 60. “Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with 
the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a 
party.” U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. Failure to conform to the obligations 
required by an ICJ judgment may result in further measures taken by the 
U.N. Security Council against the offending country to the extent necessary 
to effectuate the judgment. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2. 
 74. Ecuador has vowed to “pursue every legal means to bring Assange to 
Ecuador,” and acknowledged that an appeal to the ICJ would be considered 
as a last resort. Ecuador May File Appeal to ICJ If UK Refuses Assange Safe 
Passage, RUS. TODAY (Aug. 19, 2012), http://rt.com/news/ecuador-icc-assange-
asylum-942/. 
 75. The U.N.’s responsibilities are divided amongst five principal organs: 
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic & Social Council, 
the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. U.N. Charter art. 7, 
para 1. The sixth organ listed in the Charter, a Trusteeship Council, “sus-
pended operation on 1 November 1994, with the independence of Palau, the 
last remaining United Nations trust territory,” and now meets only “as occa-
sion require[s].” Trusteeship Council, U.N., 
http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
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Further, the ICJ is the only body that is capable of rectifying 
the uncertainty following its ruling in Asylum Case, the last 
instance in which it heard a case regarding diplomatic asy-
lum.76 Asylum Case, the first ruling on the Haya de la Torre 
dispute,77 involved a Peruvian national who was granted dip-
lomatic asylum in the Colombian embassy in Lima, Peru, after 
a warrant was issued for his arrest by the Peruvian govern-
ment.78 When Peru refused Colombia’s request to allow Haya 
de la Torre safe passage into Colombia, Colombia brought suit 
against Peru in the ICJ.79 Colombia invoked “American inter-
national law in general” and “regional or local custom peculiar 
to Latin-American States” to argue that Haya de la Torre was a 
proper recipient of diplomatic asylum.80 In response, Peru ar-
gued that Colombia’s decision to grant asylum was in violation 
of multiple articles of the Havana Convention on Asylum, and 
                                                                                                             
The secretariat is primarily responsible for carrying out the daily tasks of the 
U.N. and servicing the other principal organs. It is not designed to effectuate 
a resolution based on analysis of international law. See U.N. Charter arts. 
97–101. The Economic and Social Council is responsible for “international 
economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters,” and is ill 
equipped to resolve a dispute with significant political ramifications. Id. art. 
62, para. 1. The Security Council is conferred the “primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security,” id. art. 24, para. 1, but 
the standoff between the parties appears to be limited to political posturing 
and threats. The General Assembly (“G.A.”) has broad discretion to consider 
“any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or re-
lating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present 
Charter.” Id. art. 10. 
 76. The only sources that have addressed (or notably failed to address) the 
concept of diplomatic asylum have been the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (where it was not included despite efforts by Latin American coun-
tries), Asylum Case, and the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum. 
Kurbalija, supra note 67. 
 77. See Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20). 
 78. Haya de la Torre was a controversial figure throughout Latin America 
based on his political involvement fighting for democracy and labor rights. 
Victor Raùl Haya de la Torre, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (“UNHCR”), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b72551038.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 79. Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 272–73. 
 80. Id. at 270, 276. Colombia argued that as a result of this customary law, 
Peru was bound “to give ‘the guarantees necessary for the departure of the 
refugee, with due regard to the inviolability of his person, from the country.’” 
Id. at 268. 
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that Colombia had no right to grant asylum to Haya de la Torre 
as a means of avoiding Peru’s laws.81 To resolve the dispute, 
the Court had to determine whether Colombia was “competent 
to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and defini-
tive decision binding on Peru.”82 
To determine the binding nature of Colombia’s decision to 
grant Haya de la Torre diplomatic asylum, the Court applied 
the rule that conduct that has been established as custom in a 
country is considered binding law in that country.83 The Court 
first determined that Colombia had not proven that the rule of 
diplomatic asylum had a binding effect on Peru.84 The Court 
considered “a large number of particular cases in which diplo-
matic asylum was in fact granted and respected,”85 but held 
such evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that the custom 
existed in Latin America.86 It found that even if custom were 
proven in Colombia, it would also have to exist in Peru to have 
a binding effect on both parties, and this was not the case.87 
The Court next posited that, although “asylum may be grant-
ed on humanitarian grounds in order to protect political of-
fenders against the violent and disorderly action of irresponsi-
ble sections of the population,” this issue was not in dispute 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. at 270. 
 82. Id. at 274. 
 83. Id. at 276. 
 84. Id. at 277–78. 
 85. Id. at 277. 
 86. Id. 
The facts . . . disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so 
much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asy-
lum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, there 
has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conven-
tions on asylum . . . and the practice has been so much influenced by 
considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is 
not possible to discern in al1 this any constant and uniform usage, 
accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and de-
finitive qualification of the offence. 
Id. 
 87. Id. at 277–78. The Court demonstrated that Peru had actively avoided 
adopting diplomatic asylum as custom by virtue of not ratifying two Montevi-
deo Conventions. Id. at 278. 
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between the parties.88 The ICJ then considered the confining 
language of the Havana Convention to hold that “asylum can-
not be opposed to the operation of justice.”89 The Court elabo-
rated by stating “the safety which arises out of asylum cannot 
be construed as a protection against the regular application of 
the laws and against the jurisdiction of legally constituted tri-
bunals.”90 In adding that such vast protection “would . . . be-
come the equivalent of an immunity,”91 the Court’s final dispo-
sition gives a clear indication that diplomatic asylum is not 
recognized by international law.92 However, the ICJ also recog-
nized that diplomatic asylum in Latin America was “an institu-
tion which . . . owes its development to extra-legal factors” and 
could continue to exist in customary international law via 
“agreements between interested governments inspired by mu-
tual feelings of toleration and goodwill.”93 
The impact of the ICJ’s open invitation to engage in diplo-
matic asylum within the context of customary law was felt im-
mediately. On June 13, 1951, the ICJ made a second ruling on 
the Haya de la Torre matter, the Haya de la Torre Case.94 The 
Court ruled that, although the asylum granted to Haya de la 
Torre should have been terminated, “Colombia [was] under no 
obligation to surrender Victor Ratil Haya de la Torre to the Pe-
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. at 282–83. The Court later discounted the possibility that the term 
“urgent cases” was intended to encompass “the danger of regular prosecution 
to which the citizens of any country lay themselves open by attacking the 
institutions of that country.” Id. at 284. 
 89. Id. at 284. The Court specifically cited Article 2, paragraph 2 of the 
Havana Convention, which provided that “[a]sylum may not be granted ex-
cept in urgent cases and for the period of time strictly indispensable for the 
person who has sought asylum to ensure some way his safety.” Id. at 282. 
This was taken in conjunction with Article I, paragraph 1, which provided 
that states could not grant asylum “to persons accused or condemned for 
common crimes . . .” Id. at 281. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 286. The ICJ specifically struggled to find where diplomatic 
asylum found its legal basis, as “considerations of convenience or simple po-
litical expediency seem to have led the territorial State to recognize asylum 
without that decision being dictated by any feeling of legal obligation.” Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Haya de la Torre Case (Colom./Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 71 (June 13). 
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ruvian authorities.”95 Less than three years after this ruling, in 
1954, several American countries adopted the OAS Convention 
on Diplomatic Asylum—fourteen countries would eventually 
ratify the agreement.96 In 1961, many Latin American nations 
made a strong push for the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations to recognize diplomatic asylum,  but were forced to 
settle for limited recognition under Article 41(3).97 The general 
recognition of diplomatic asylum remains unique to Latin 
America.98 Likely as a result of Ecuador’s membership amongst 
this small group of signatories to the OAS Convention on Dip-
lomatic Asylum, The Union of South American Nations has 
pledged its support for Ecuador’s decision to grant asylum to 
Assange.99 
D. The United States: Paying Attention, but from a Distance 
The United States has publicly voiced support for the U.K., 
asserting that it “does not recognize the concept of diplomatic 
asylum as a matter of international law.”100 The United States’ 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. at 83. The Court added “there is no contradiction between these two 
findings,” and encouraged the parties to seek “a practical and satisfactory 
solution by seeking guidance from those considerations of courtesy and good-
neighborliness. . . .” Id. at 82, 83. 
 96. Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, supra note 12. 
Because diplomatic asylum was technically administered on an ad hoc basis 
following the Haya de la Torre case, a system between Latin American na-
tions developed over the years without regulation or interference by an inter-
national body. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 
(discussing the immense growth of diplomatic asylum in Latin America and 
whether it has a place within international law). 
 97. Kurbalija, supra note 67. Article 41(3) of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he premises of the 
mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of 
the missions as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of gen-
eral international law or by any special agreement in force between the send-
ing and the receiving State.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
supra note 13, art. 41(3). 
 98. Matthew Happold, Julian Assange and Diplomatic Asylum, EUR. J. 
INT’L L. BLOG (June 24, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/julian-assange-and-
diplomatic-asylum/. 
 99. Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by South America, supra note 
20. 
 100. Wikileaks: US Dismisses Calls for “Diplomatic Asylum” for Julian 
Assange, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2012), 
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role in the process is notable, as both its longstanding interest 
in Assange and its use of the death penalty for espionage are 
well known.101 The apparent willingness of the United States to 
grant diplomatic asylum under rare circumstances frames both 
sides of the conflict in a distinct manner because Ecuador is 
able to use these instances to support its argument that diplo-
matic asylum has been recognized as customary law outside 
Latin America for many years.102 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASSANGE 
DISPUTE 
There are countless features of the Assange case that have 
lent themselves to scrutiny by the international community. 
One of the primary reasons for this scrutiny is that Julian 
                                                                                                             
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/9484176/Wikileaks-
US-dismisses-calls-for-diplomatic-asylum-for-Julian-Assange.html. In an 
interesting historical note, perhaps one of the most famous cases of diplomat-
ic asylum was that of Cardinal József Mindszenty, a Hungarian who sought 
refuge from Hungary’s communist government at the U.S. embassy in Buda-
pest in 1956. Martin Austermuhle, Refuge or Refusal: How Easy Is It to Get 
Asylum at U.S. Missions? WASH. DIPLOMAT (May 31, 2012), 
http://173.201.242.50/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8351:
refuge-or-refusal-how-easy-is-it-to-get-asylum-at-us-
missions&catid=1488:june-2012&Itemid=500. After he was granted asylum, 
Mindszenty spent the next fifteen years in the U.S. embassy before he was 
permitted to leave in 1971. Id. 
 101. The U.S. Justice Department has launched a criminal investigation 
into Assange and Wikileaks regarding the release of classified information 
Wikileaks allegedly received from American soldier Bradley Manning. De-
tails of the investigation were requested by Assange’s attorneys to determine 
the nature of the allegations. Kevin Gosztola, Lawyers for Julian Assange & 
WikiLeaks Seek Details on Justice Department’s Criminal Investigation, 
FIREDOGLAKE (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2012/10/11/lawyers-for-julian-assange-
wikileaks-seek-details-on-justice-departments-criminal-investigation/. For its 
part, Sweden has stated that Assange will not be extradited if he were to face 
the death penalty in the United States. Adam Taylor, Sweden Says It Will 
Not Extradite Assange to US If He Faces Death Penalty, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 
21, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/sweden-says-it-will-not-extradite-
assange-to-us-if-he-faces-death-penalty-2012-8. 
 102. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 28 (listing key international precedents 
for diplomatic asylum). 
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Assange is a well-respected journalist.103 In his position as the 
editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, Assange has achieved notable in-
ternational recognition for his role in disseminating infor-
mation not otherwise available to the public.104 As a result of 
his efforts to create greater transparency in the media and ex-
pose numerous human rights transgressions, he has become 
something of an international celebrity, albeit under unusual 
circumstances.105 
                                                                                                             
 103. Amongst the awards Assange has received in recent years are: the 
2009 Amnesty International UK Media Award (New Media), Amnesty Inter-
national Media Awards 2009: Full List of Winners, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/jun/03/amnesty-international-media-
awards; the 2011 Sydney Peace Foundation’s gold medal for his “exceptional 
courage in pursuit of human rights,” Julian Assange Awarded Australian 
Peace Prize, GUARDIAN (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/julian-assange-australian-
peace-prize-wikileaks; the 2011 Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism for his 
work that “penetrated the established version of events and . . . expose[d] 
established propaganda,” Julian Assange Wins Martha Gellhorn Journalism 
Prize, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jun/02/julian-assange-martha-
gelhorn-prize; and the 2011 Walkley Award for Most Outstanding Contribu-
tion to Journalism for taking “a brave, determined and independent stand for 
freedom of speech and transparency that has empowered people all over the 
world.” 2011 Walkley Award Winners, WALKLEY FOUND., 
http://www.walkleys.com/2011winners#most-outstanding-contribution-to-
journalism (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 104. Wikileaks achieves its goal of “bring[ing] important news and infor-
mation to the public” by “provid[ing] an innovative, secure and anonymous 
way for sources to leak information to our journalists.” About: What Is Wik-
ileaks, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Jan. 18, 
2013). Amongst the stories the website has broken about the United States 
are classified U.S. reports on the war in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay’s main 
operations manuals. Id. 
 105. A number of high-profile supporters of Assange have forfeited 
£300,000, which was offered as sureties and securities after Assange skipped 
bail. Celebrity Backers Are £300,000 Down But Still Supporting Assange De-
spite His Decision to Skip Bail, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2215373/Celebrity-backers-300-000-
supporting-Assange-despite-decision-skip-bail.html. Michael Moore, Oliver 
Stone, and Noam Chomsky are three of the many “celebrities” who signed a 
letter to President Correa on June 25, 2012, urging him to grant asylum to 
Assange. Moore, Glover, Stone, Maher, Greenwald, Wolf, Ellsberg Urge Cor-
rea to Grant Asylum to Assange, JUSTFOREIGNPOLICY.ORG (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/1257. 
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From a legal perspective, however, the convergence of inter-
ests in the Assange dispute is perhaps the most alluring. At the 
heart of the conflict is Ecuador, a country that has chosen to 
protect Assange’s “human rights” while its president, Rafael 
Correa, continues to suppress freedom of speech and press 
within Ecuador. 106  The Ecuadorian government’s seemingly 
contradictory positions have led some to question whether Ec-
uador’s instrumental role in the process is the result of its le-
gitimate human rights concerns, or President Correa making a 
calculated political gamble.107 On the other side of the dispute 
is the U.K., which is now faced with the daunting task of moni-
toring Assange’s every move in the Ecuadorian embassy in or-
der to uphold its duty to execute the EAW.108 
Three other parties have a vested interest in the case for dis-
tinctly different reasons: Sweden, the United States, and Aus-
tralia. The root of the conflict is Assange’s alleged misconduct 
in Sweden, which finds itself at the center of controversy as to 
whether they have their own ulterior motives for Assange de-
                                                                                                             
 106. “Research by numerous international human rights defenders . . . has 
concluded that the Correa administration does not brook dissent and is en-
gaged in a campaign to silence its critics in the media.” Carlos Lauría, As It 
Backs Assange, Ecuador Stifles Expression at Home, COMM. TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://cpj.org/blog/2012/08/as-it-backs-assange-
ecuador-represses-free-express.php. In his defense, President Correa has 
stated that his approach “was necessary to rein in private [media] who had 
enjoyed too much power for too long.” Jonathan Watts, Rafael Correa Hits 
Back over Ecuador’s Press Freedom and Charge of Hypocrisy, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
24, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/24/rafael-correa-
assange-ecuador-press. 
 107. One prevailing thought is that Ecuador’s position is largely motivated 
by President Correa’s desire “to settle old scores” with the United States, as 
well as to “display his political prowess in the run-up to the Ecuadorian pres-
idential elections next year.” Anita Isaacs, It’s Not about Assange, Op-Ed., 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/opinion/why-
correa-lets-assange-stay-in-ecuador-embassy.html. 
 108. “Scotland Yard confirmed it costs £11,000 day to ensure the Australian 
does not flee . . . the Ecuadorean Embassy.” Chris Greenwood, Police Stake-
out Bill for Assange Tops £11,000 a DAY to Ensure He Doesn’t Flee Ecuadori-
an Embassy, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2211530/Police-stakeout-Assange-
tops-1m-costs-11-000-DAY-ensure-doesnt-flee-Ecuadorian-Embassy.html. 
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spite their guarantees to the contrary. 109  Next, despite the 
United States’ compelling interest in how the Assange case is 
handled, the country appears content to leave “Assange’s im-
mediate fate . . . in the hands of Britain, Sweden, and Ecua-
dor.”110 Finally, despite Australia’s status as Assange’s birth-
place, it has conspicuously distanced itself from the Assange 
controversy, prompting some citizens and politicians to wonder 
why Ecuador was willing to protect Assange when his own gov-
ernment was not.111 
The international attention given to the Assange standoff has 
served to force Ecuador’s hand.112 The scrutiny has compelled 
Ecuador to defend its position vociferously on an international 
stage, an undoubtedly different strategy than that which is 
typically utilized when diplomatic asylum is granted amongst 
Latin American nations. For example, the case would likely re-
ceive little attention if Assange sought refuge at an Ecuadorean 
embassy located in a nation that had ratified the OAS Conven-
                                                                                                             
 109. See Taylor, supra note 101. Deputy Director of the Service for Criminal 
Cases and International Cooperation of Sweden’s Justice Ministry, Cecelia 
Riddselius, stated that Sweden “will never surrender a person to the death 
penalty.” Id. 
 110. Mark Hosenball, Julian Assange, Wikileaks Founder, Faces No Crimi-
nal Charges in U.S., Sources Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/22/julian-assange-wikileaks-no-
criminal-charges-in-us_n_1823159.html (“[S]ources say the United States has 
issued no criminal charges against [Assange] and has launched no attempt to 
extradite him [to the Unites States].”); Philip Dorling, US Calls Assange ‘En-
emy of State’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/us-calls-assange-enemy-of-
state-20120927-26m7s.html. It was reported on September 27, 2012, that 
Assange and Wikileaks were “designated as enemies of the United States,” a 
designation which “ha[s] serious implications for [Assange] if he were to be 
extradited to the U.S.” Id. 
 111. Monica Attard, Ecuador Gives Assange Asylum, but for Australia 
‘Nothing Has Changed’, CNN (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/17/world/asia/australia-assange-asylum-
ecuador/index.html. 
 112. Ecuador insinuated that the attention being given to Assange is not 
only the result of “persecution in different countries [as a result of exposing] 
corruption and severe human rights abuses of citizens around the world,” but 
also the desire of various nations to cater to the desires of the United States. 
Declaración del Gobierno, supra note 29. 
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tion on Diplomatic Asylum.113 However, the U.K. is not a party 
to that convention and it does not otherwise recognize the con-
cept of diplomatic asylum.114 Therefore, the protection available 
to Ecuador if asylum were granted in another Latin American 
country does not apply.115 
Ecuador, aware of its dilemma, looked for guidance from an 
international organization in which membership is nearly uni-
versal: the U.N.116 Since diplomatic asylum was not formally 
recognized at the 1961 Vienna Convention,117 Ecuador support-
ed its position by demonstrating that political asylum was a 
universally recognized principle118 and by citing to the inviola-
bility of the diplomatic mission.119 In demonstrating universal 
recognition of two separate concepts that, taken together, offer 
some support for diplomatic asylum, Ecuador established that 
Assange is safe from extradition while he remains in its em-
                                                                                                             
 113. See Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, supra 
note 12 (indicating that membership consists exclusively of Latin American 
nations). 
 114. Foreign Secretary Statement, supra note 17. See also Question of Dip-
lomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶¶ 155–56 (proposing to the Internal Law 
Commission “that the words ‘in its territory’ should be added after the word 
‘asylum’” because “that practice had not been accepted by the majority of Eu-
ropean States, and by the United Kingdom Government in particular”). 
 115. Id. Of the legal documents that Ecuador cites as support for its posi-
tion, some are binding on the U.K. and some are not. See Declaración del Go-
bierno, supra note 29. 
 116. See Press Release, Dept. of Pub. Info., United Nations Member States, 
U.N. Press Release ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006) (listing the 192 member states 
after Montenegro was admitted on June 28, 2006). 
 117. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is the treaty that reg-
ulates diplomatic relations between countries; it notably excludes any lan-
guage that would have recognized the concept of diplomatic asylum. See Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 13, art. 41(3). 
 118. Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27 
of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Geneva Conven-
tion provide the most relevant support on this issue. See sources cited supra 
note 11; see generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (although this 
document does not explicitly reference the right of asylum, the articles dis-
cuss at length the rights of parties taken as prisoners during international 
conflicts, whose status may eventually become that of an asylee). 
 119. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 13. 
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bassy.120 In addition, Ecuador has put the onus on Sweden to 
guarantee that Assange will not face subsequent extraditions 
to a “third country . . . that would put at risk Mr. Assange’s life 
and freedom.”121 However, up to this point, all appearances are 
that Ecuador has found Sweden’s response unsatisfactory in 
that it has not been able to guarantee Assange will not face ex-
tradition to a third country.122 
The problems demonstrated by the Assange case are illustra-
tive of the lack of regulation surrounding diplomatic asylum 
that has existed on an international scale for more than a cen-
tury.123 On one hand, widespread recognition of diplomatic asy-
lum has been limited to Latin America since the nineteenth 
century.124 In theory, Latin American nations are able to grant 
diplomatic asylum freely amongst other parties to the OAS 
                                                                                                             
 120. See Ecuador President Correa Wants ‘Guarantee’ Over Assange, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19309183. Given the 
fact that Assange’s stay has extended to seven months, with no sign of an 
impending resolution, the U.K. appears resigned to the protection afforded to 
Assange within the embassy. Meanwhile, Assange has also realized his 
unique status and continues to make “public appearances” from the embassy. 
See Alexander Rankine, Oxford Students to Protest at Assange ‘Visit,’ 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2013/jan/10/oxford-students-to-protest-
at-assange-talk. 
 121. Ecuador President Correa Wants ‘Guarantee’ over Assange, supra note 
120. 
 122. Although Deputy Director of the Service for Criminal Cases and Inter-
national Cooperation of Sweden’s Justice Ministry, Cecelia Riddselius, has 
stated “that they would demand strict assurances from the US that ‘the pris-
oner will not be executed in any case,’” she admitted that it was impossible to 
guarantee whether Assange would be extradited without a formal extradition 
request. Taylor, supra note 101. 
 123. This lack of regulation is likely the result of an international communi-
ty that has failed to recognize the problems that accompany widespread use. 
Despite the issues discussed in detail in the U.N. Secretary-General report, 
no significant steps were taken by the U.N. to clarify the right of asylum es-
tablished in numerous agreements. See supra note 63. A 1967 protocol made 
small changes to diplomatic asylum, specifically with regards to temporal and 
geographic limitations, but it did not take the opportunity to redefine the 
right of asylum generally. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 124. See supra note 65. 
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Convention on Diplomatic Asylum.125 On the other hand, be-
cause diplomatic asylum draws numerous fundamental simi-
larities to political asylum, countries such as Ecuador are able 
to support their arguments on an international scale with nu-
merous universally recognized documents that non-OAS par-
ties are unable or unwilling to challenge.126 It is not in the best 
interests of the U.K. and the United States, long-standing and 
integral members of the U.N., to challenge treaties that have 
been in force for decades and are of fundamental importance to 
the development of human rights.127 
Foreign-relations law introduces another complication in ad-
dressing diplomatic asylum. 128  Each party involved in the 
Assange case occupies a unique role within the controversy. 
Ecuador’s position on asylum has been widely criticized, but 
regional support appears to have strengthened the country’s 
resolve. 129  Ecuador now appears fully prepared to let the 
                                                                                                             
 125. Although exact figures are unavailable, there is evidence that Latin 
American nations have granted diplomatic asylum on a frequent basis since 
it became prevalent in the nineteenth century. The U.N. report lists seven 
instances over a period of forty-one years when diplomatic asylum was grant-
ed, and acknowledges that the “list is purely illustrative” of “[m]any other 
examples . . . mentioned in the records in the asylum case and in various pub-
lications.” Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 12. The ICJ 
acknowledged that the “Colombian Government has referred to a large num-
ber of particular cases in which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and 
respected.” Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20). 
 126. See, e.g., supra note 29. 
 127. Not only were the U.K. and the United States members of the U.N. 
when the Charter was ratified in 1945, but both nations have maintained 
permanent membership status on the U.N. Security Council since that time. 
U.N. Charter art. 110; U.N. Charter art. 23. 
 128. The term “foreign-relations law” has come to encompass the modern 
definition of “international law,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 
720, which is defined as “the law of international relations, embracing not 
only nations but also such participants as international organizations and 
individuals (such as those who invoke their human rights or commit war 
crimes).” Id. at 892. 
 129. Although the ministers pledged their general support for Ecuador, they 
have also taken a diplomatic stance on the dispute, urging that both parties 
“continue the dialogue and negotiation to find a mutually acceptable solu-
tion.” Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by South America, supra note 20; 
see discussion supra Part II. 
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Assange situation run its course.130 Although Sweden’s interest 
in questioning a man who allegedly committed crimes of a sex-
ual nature has not been challenged, speculation is rampant as 
to whether Sweden is a conduit for the United States to gain 
possession of Assange to try him in the U.S. legal system.131 
Even if a party were to disregard the potential risks that ac-
company drastic measures against Ecuador, each nation must 
also consider the risks of going against the Latin American na-
tions that have pledged their support for Ecuador.132 
Smaller regional international organizations, such as the 
OAS, further strain the balance between the protection of re-
gional interests and the promotion of global cooperation.133 Up 
to this point, Ecuador’s membership in the OAS has caused 
manifest problems because of the tacit support Ecuador has 
received from other OAS members as well as the legal basis the 
                                                                                                             
 130. Ecuador has stated that Assange could remain inside its embassy for 
“two centuries” if necessary. Luke Harding, Julian Assange Can Stay in Em-
bassy for ‘Centuries’, Says Ecuador, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/aug/23/julian-assange-ecuador-
embassy. 
 131. Some believe Sweden’s continued role has been dictated by the fact 
that it is easier for the United States to extradite Assange from Sweden than 
it would be from the U.K., although in reality this may be more difficult. 
Green, supra note 33. The United States and Sweden have enjoyed a strong 
relationship over the years, as evidenced by their military cooperation during 
the Cold War. Peter Vinthagen Simpson, Research Reveals Depth of Sweden-
US Cold War Relations, LOCAL (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.thelocal.se/18262/20090317/#.UPLzW6HjlH8. 
 132. The U.K. has sought to improve its trade relations with Latin America 
in recent years, an effort that may be severely hampered as a result of its 
declining reputation in the region. Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by 
South America, supra note 20. 
 133. The OAS is the “world’s oldest regional organization,” which dates 
back to the First International Conference of American States in 1890. The 
First International Conference of American States also established “the inter-
American system, the oldest international institutional system.” Who We Are, 
OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 
2013). It was created “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote 
their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.” Charter of the 
Organization of American States art. 1, para. 1, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 
119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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binding regional treaties under the OAS provide.134 However, 
membership to the OAS should not affect Ecuador’s responsi-
bilities to the U.N.135 The OAS exists as a regional agency with-
in the U.N. and provides that one of the principal responsibili-
ties of the OAS General Assembly is “[t]o strengthen and coor-
dinate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies.”136 Although the OAS predates the U.N.,137 its charter 
recognizes the authority of the U.N. and relies upon the recog-
nition and protection provided by the U.N. 138 
A party’s membership to the U.N. is conditioned upon its ac-
ceptance and execution of the various binding U.N. agree-
ments.139 However, there are significant obstacles to enforcing 
a commitment of such large proportions. For one, smaller or-
ganizations, such as the OAS, are typically more effective in 
addressing the needs of their constituent member nations.140 
                                                                                                             
 134. All members of the OAS have supported Ecuador’s decision to grant 
Assange asylum, except for the United States and Canada. Jason Reed, Latin 
America, Caribbean Unite to Support Ecuador over Assange, REUTERS (Aug. 
22, 2012), available at http://rt.com/news/oas-support-ecuador-assange-529/. 
 135. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 133, 
art. 1 (“Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a 
regional agency.”); id. art. 140 (“None of the provisions of this Charter shall 
be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States 
under the Charter of the United Nations.”). 
 136. Id. art. 54(c). 
 137. Although the origins of the OAS may date back to 1889, the U.N. 
Charter was signed three years before the OAS signed their charter. Who We 
Are, supra note 133; U.N. Charter, opened for signature June 26, 1945; Char-
ter of the Organization of American States, supra note 133 (signed in Bogotá, 
Colombia in 1948). 
 138. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 133, 
art. 1 (“The Organization of American States has no powers other than those 
expressly conferred upon it by this Charter . . . .”); id. art. 131. 
 139. See U.N. Charter art. 2 (discussing the obligations of members to “act 
in accordance with the following Principles”); id. arts. 5–6 (detailing the pen-
alties for member states that do not comply with the principles outlined in 
Article 2). 
 140. Regional organizations are better equipped to address the concerns of 
their member states. The effectiveness of such organizations is contingent 
upon smaller membership, specifically tailored purposes, and a larger voice 
for each of its members. See Johannes F. Linn & Oksana Pidufala, The Expe-
rience with Regional Economic Cooperation Organizations: Lessons for Cen-
tral Asia 6 (Wolfensohn Ctr. for Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 4, 
2000), available at 
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For this reason, the U.N may find that adherence to the princi-
ples espoused by various U.N. instruments is lacking on issues 
where a regional organization provides exceptional support.141 
Although the U.N. encourages such regional agreements,142 a 
hierarchy amongst the numerous U.N. treaties naturally 
emerges in relation to these regional agreements depending on 
various factors, including the stability of the government, the 
system of government in place, and the level of discretion al-
lowed for interpretation of the U.N. treaties.143 
Ecuador has attempted to manipulate its dual membership in 
the OAS and the U.N. by arguing that diplomatic asylum is 
supported by an OAS regional treaty, as well as by U.N. trea-
ties that have protected human rights for many years.144 Alt-
hough the validity of diplomatic asylum is reasonably ques-
tioned, the U.N. treaties Ecuador references in the dispute are 
not easily dismissed.145 Assange presents an ideal opportunity 
                                                                                                             
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/carec%20int
egration%20linn/10_carec_integration_linn.pdf. Implicit amongst these re-
gional organizations is a willingness to address issues that would otherwise 
not be addressed by larger international organizations. Id. at 4. 
 141. Ecuador’s relationship with the OAS and other Latin American na-
tions, as demonstrated by its ratification of the Convention on Diplomatic 
Asylum, is emblematic of this concern. 
 142. See U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1 (“Nothing in the present Charter pre-
cludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations.”). 
 143. See generally U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 7015th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.7015 (Aug. 6, 2013) (discussing how “different perspectives” resulting 
from diverse membership pose challenges to cooperation between the U.N., 
regional, and subregional organizations in peacefully resolving disputes). 
 144. Although Ecuador cites various pieces of international law, the prima-
ry basis for its hardline stance is the existence of diplomatic asylum as cus-
tomary law in Latin America, as established by the Convention on Diplomatic 
Asylum and the Haya de la Torre decision. See supra note 12 and text accom-
panying note 93. 
 145. Given the lack of precedent of taking over “the sovereign territory of 
another country,” the U.K.’s threat to invade the Ecuadorean embassy and 
thus violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was seen by 
many as a “huge mistake.” ‘UK Made a Huge Mistake Threatening Ecuador’—
Analyst, RT (Aug. 17, 2012), http://rt.com/news/uk-ecuador-threat-mistake-
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for the U.N. to resolve the ambiguities surrounding diplomatic 
asylum that should have been addressed many years ago.146 
The popularity of Julian Assange, the foreign-relations implica-
tions of the issue, and the unlikelihood of an amicable resolu-
tion to the conflict demonstrate the need for a recognized inter-
national body to take a leadership role to develop a uniform 
international standard for diplomatic asylum. 
III. WHY ASSANGE PRESENTS AN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO END 
THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM 
A. The International Court of Justice is Best Qualified to Hear 
the Dispute 
In order to maintain their preeminence, it is important for 
the ICJ to demonstrate that it is in control and continues to act 
in the best interests of the international community.147 The ICJ 
is empowered by judicial authority that extends beyond that of 
any other international court.148 Since membership to the ICJ 
                                                                                                             
assange-894/. This threat likely portrayed Ecuador’s position in a more favor-
able light to the international community by demonstrating that attempts to 
negotiate in good faith were met with aggressive behavior from the U.K. and 
Sweden. Id. 
 146. Several notable steps could have been taken before the U.N. Secretary-
General report that could have curbed the use of diplomatic asylum in such a 
manner that future conflict would have been avoided. One example of such a 
step is placing certain limits on U.N. membership. See, e.g., supra note 125 
(discussing the development of diplomatic asylum in Latin America in the 
years leading up to the U.N. Report on Diplomatic Asylum). 
 147. Along with its indisputable international nexus, the Assange dispute is 
also unique in that it implicates each of the purposes stated for the U.N.’s 
existence. See U.N. Charter art. 1 (establishing the four broad purposes of the 
U.N.: maintaining peace and international security; developing friendly rela-
tions; achieving international cooperation; and harmonizing of actions, all of 
which are implicated by the Assange dispute). 
 148. This can be implied from the fact that “[a]ll members of the United 
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice,” as well as from the broad discretion the ICJ is permitted to exercise as 
part of its role. U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1; ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 
36(2) (the Court has authority to rule on “all legal disputes concerning: a. the 
interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the exist-
ence of any fact which . . . would constitute a breach of an international obli-
gation; [and] d. the . . . reparation to be made for the breach of an interna-
tional obligation”). 
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is exclusive, and both Ecuador and the U.K. are ipso facto par-
ties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice by vir-
tue of their membership in the U.N.,149 the Court should take 
advantage of an opportunity to resolve a dispute between two 
parties that are bound to its rulings. 
An essential aspect of the ICJ’s involvement in the Assange 
dispute is whether either Ecuador or the U.K., each of which 
stands to lose a great deal if they do not prevail, is willing to 
allow the ICJ to intervene.150 Although Ecuador’s controversial 
position has already placed its international reputation at 
risk—at least amongst Sweden, the U.K., and the United 
States—an adverse ruling by the ICJ would seemingly bring an 
end to a situation that Ecuador is content to allow resolve it-
self.151 However, the leverage that the U.K. has in the negotia-
tions as a result of their geographical and geopolitical ad-
vantages over Ecuador would be at risk if the ICJ were to make 
an adverse determination. 
Although the outcome will primarily impact Assange’s future, 
the ramifications of the case also extend to the various pieces of 
international law that will be affected by a definitive ruling on 
diplomatic asylum.152 The ICJ’s role as the U.N.’s judicial organ 
illustrates that this authority must be exercised in the context 
of the entire U.N. organization.153 The fact that the ICJ was 
established by the U.N. Charter and owes its existence to the 
very document it has been entrusted to protect demonstrates 
that an ICJ determination should seek to reach a fair determi-
nation, while still promoting the stated purposes of the U.N.154 
                                                                                                             
 149. See U.N. Charter art. 93. 
 150. Prevailing thoughts on diplomatic asylum support the belief that Ec-
uador would be the underdog in a formal legal proceeding. See Julian Ku, 
Ecuador Has Got to Be Bluffing About Its ICJ Case for Assange, OPINIO JURIS 
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/08/24/ecuador-has-got-to-be-
bluffing-about-its-icj-case-for-assange/ (stating that Ecuador’s potential claim 
to the ICJ is so preposterous as to “be blown out of the water by the ICJ”). 
 151. See Harding, supra note 130. 
 152. See generally supra note 29 (five of the sixteen legal instruments cited 
by Ecuador as supporting their position were either U.N. documents or were 
instruments that required U.N. enforcement). 
 153. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 154. Even though the statute does not specifically provide that the ICJ 
should consider principles espoused by the U.N., the structure and compe-
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If the ICJ is requested to hear155 the Assange case, the pro-
ceeding will provide an opportunity for the ICJ to revisit its in-
conclusive ruling in Haya de la Torre and establish definitive 
guidelines as to the availability of diplomatic asylum within 
customary international law. 156  Since the enactment of the 
OAS Treaty on Diplomatic Asylum, there has not been a defini-
tive ruling by a recognized international body on the availabil-
ity of diplomatic asylum.157 As a result, an inevitable conflict 
has developed over the last fifty years, where the practice of 
diplomatic asylum has been allowed to flourish in certain are-
as, and thus become regional custom, while it has fallen into 
disuse in other regions. 158  As the result of numerous high-
profile disputes that highlight the inconsistent law in this field, 
the ICJ’s failure to institute a universal standard for diplomat-
                                                                                                             
tence of the Court make it difficult to imagine a case in which the Court is 
not at least encouraged to take into account such concerns. See generally ICJ 
Statute, supra note 70 (setting forth the Court’s organization, competence, 
procedure, advisory opinions, and amendments). 
 155. The ICJ cannot hear a dispute “of its own motion” and can only review 
a case when a nation requests them to do so. See Frequently Asked Questions, 
INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ), http://www.icj-
cij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2 (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). While 
Ecuador has threatened to pursue such an appeal, there is no evidence that 
either party has requested that the ICJ resolve the dispute. Ecuador May 
File Appeal to ICJ If UK Refuses Assange Safe Passage, supra note 74. Alt-
hough it is possible that the Court would be asked to give an advisory opinion 
under Article 65, the Assange dispute is more aptly described as a legal dis-
pute between Ecuador and the U.K. than a legal question to be determined 
without the two parties’ involvement. ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 65. 
 156. See generally Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 266–89 (Nov. 20) 
(stating that diplomatic asylum was not protected by international law, but it 
may exist as customary law if accepted by all parties involved); Haya de la 
Torre Case (Colom./Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 82 (June 13) (where the Court 
acknowledged that even though “asylum must cease . . . the Government of 
Colombia [was] under no obligation to bring this about by surrendering the 
refugee to the Peruvian authorities”). 
 157. See Kurbalija, supra note 67 (indicating that the issue of diplomatic 
asylum has not been addressed since the Haya de la Torre decision). 
 158. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 12 (the seven in-
stances over a period of forty-one years when diplomatic asylum was granted 
were “purely illustrative” of the “[m]any other examples . . . mentioned in the 
records in the asylum case and in various publications.”); Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. 
at 277 (the “Colombian Government has referred to a large number of partic-
ular cases in which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and respected”). 
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ic asylum in the Haya de la Torre decision can no longer be ig-
nored.159 
The urgent nature of the Assange dispute lends itself to re-
view by the ICJ, which should have the opportunity to review 
both parties’ arguments before the situation becomes untena-
ble, which may come either as the result of Assange’s declining 
health or from the mounting adverse implications for foreign 
relations.160 The numerous diplomatic missions in foreign coun-
tries are undoubtedly affected by the legitimacy of the action 
taken by Ecuador. In particular, these diplomatic missions 
have a compelling interest in a definitive ruling on whether 
diplomatic asylum occupies a role within customary interna-
tional law.161 The ICJ’s inconclusive resolution to Haya de la 
                                                                                                             
 159. While the Haya de la Torre decision was binding only on Colombia and 
Peru, the ICJ should have been aware that its decision would extend beyond 
the immediate parties. See ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 59 (“The decision 
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case.”); id. art. 36(2) (establishing the jurisdiction of the Court 
in most international matters); id. art. 38(1) (listing factors that should be 
considered by the ICJ when making their determination, which include in-
ternational custom and “the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations”). 
 160. Ecuador has had some concerns about Assange’s health, and the U.K. 
has vowed not to prevent Assange from receiving medical care if it becomes 
necessary. Julian Assange ‘Has Lung Infection,’ BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20537157. Furthermore, it is difficult to imag-
ine a scenario in which the U.N. will continue to allow Assange to make pub-
lic attacks on the United States—as he has done via satellite to the U.N.—
without some type of intervention, especially after a U.N. report in March 
2012 indicated that Wikileaks ally Bradley Manning “may have been treated 
inhumanely.” See Ashley Fantz, Assange Speaks via Satellite from London, 
Calls for End to ‘Persecution,’ CNN (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/26/world/assange-un-address/index.html. 
 161. Resolution of this case would have a significant impact on internation-
al relations. On one hand, nations will likely have some guidance as to 
whether diplomatic asylum is a recognized extension of political asylum with-
in international law. On the other hand, “[m]ost countries are fiercely protec-
tive of their embassies” and have a vested interest in the level of protection 
extended to their embassies under the right of diplomatic asylum. Timothy 
McDonald, Assange Case Could Have Wider Impact on Diplomacy, ABC (Aug. 
16, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/s3569084.htm. At 
the very least, most observers agree that the bar to revoking such diplomatic 
immunity is extremely high, considering both the context and the legislation 
in place. Id. 
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Torre can no longer be seen as a viable option since neither 
party in the present dispute has shown signs of conceding.162 
The ICJ should take responsibility for mitigating an interna-
tional crisis of indeterminate proportions by redefining cus-
tomary international law to address diplomatic asylum, while 
also addressing the conflicting pieces of international law that 
have formed the basis for the arguments on both sides of the 
dispute.163 
B. A New Standard Must Provide Clear Guidelines in Order to 
Ensure Cooperation and Prevent Confusion 
1. Ambiguous Language Has Doomed Application of Diplomatic 
Asylum on an International Scale 
In order to ensure the attention to detail that creating a de-
finitive standard requires, the ICJ must undertake a multi-
step process in presenting a solution to the question of diplo-
matic asylum. The Court must first develop a new standard for 
diplomatic asylum that incorporates precise language as to how 
diplomatic asylum will be analyzed in the context of customary 
international law. A broad rule addressing international hu-
man rights, such as the one established by the ICJ in the Asy-
lum Case, is inappropriate in that it exhibits significant defer-
ence to principles of sovereignty. 164  Further, such sovereign 
principles are likely to be closely aligned to regional beliefs.165 
                                                                                                             
 162. Fittingly, South American ministers encouraged the parties to contin-
ue the negotiation process despite voicing public support for Ecuador. See 
supra note 129. 
 163. See generally supra note 29 (listing the numerous legal instruments 
cited by Ecuador in support of its decision to grant Assange diplomatic asy-
lum); note 31 (illustrating the “conflicting viewpoints” between Ecuador and 
the U.K. regarding the countries’ international obligations). 
 164. The consequence of a deferential resolution may be perceived as the 
Court’s acquiescence to subsequent events in the regions that are affected, 
such as the events that transpired after the Haya de la Torre cases. See gen-
erally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 (discussing the history 
and growth of diplomatic asylum, most notably in Latin America). 
 165. See supra note 139 (stating that regional organizations are specifically 
designed to address issues that would otherwise go unresolved in the larger 
international community). 
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While regional customs and sovereign principles are im-
portant in determining the context in which a dispute arises, 
the function of an international dispute resolution body is to 
provide a solution “in accordance with international law.”166 
Thus, even when a regional dispute such as Haya de la Torre 
comes before the ICJ, the ICJ has broad discretion to deter-
mine what canons of international law apply.167 Since the U.N. 
Charter and international treaties merely provide guidelines 
for member states, and not a binding body of law, the ICJ is 
entrusted to interpret ambiguous international standards for 
disputes that often result from a basic lack of conformity 
amongst different legal systems.168 
The ICJ’s ruling in Asylum Case was notably lacking in its ef-
fort to define absolute terms that would bind the parties to cus-
tomary international law. The Court’s broad statement that 
“asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice”169 pro-
vided an opportunity for nations to adopt their own interpreta-
tions on when this would be implicated.170 The custom that re-
sulted from the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum ap-
                                                                                                             
 166. ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 38(1). 
 167. Within its broad responsibility “to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law,” the ICJ is to apply, 
a. international conventions . . . establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; [and] d. . . . judicial decisions and the 
teachings . . . of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the de-
termination of rules of law. 
Id. 
 168. The International Criminal Court is a reflection of an attempt to codify 
certain aspects of criminal law in international law, although the court’s ef-
forts up to this point have concentrated on crimes committed on a large scale. 
For instance, it has attempted to “reach[] a  consensus on definitions of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” About the Court, INT’L CRIM. 
CT., http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Jan. 
19, 2013). 
 169. Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 284 (Nov. 20). 
 170. The Court’s attempt to qualify this term, by stating that “[t]he safety 
which arises out of asylum cannot be construed as a protection against the 
regular application of the laws and against the jurisdiction of legally consti-
tuted tribunals[,]” id., missed the mark by failing to limit the subjectivity of 
the term “justice.” 
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pears to comport with the ICJ’s general advice to observe cus-
tomary law and undertake good faith efforts to come to a nego-
tiated settlement.171 Although the Haya de la Torre model has 
survived for more than fifty years, it is apparent that a new 
standard must emerge that better takes into account globaliza-
tion and the importance of uniformity regarding fundamental 
human rights. 
The Asylum Case standard initially failed in its effort to spec-
ify whether different standards would apply to political asylum 
and diplomatic asylum.172 Specific conditions relating to the 
“urgency” and duration of diplomatic asylum must not only de-
fine asylum in general terms, but also address whether politi-
cal asylum and diplomatic asylum will be treated differently in 
the future.173 The urgency of a case is dependent on numerous 
factors and thus almost entirely reliant on a subjective deter-
mination by the nation granting asylum.174 A modern determi-
nation should therefore seek to establish an objective standard 
that is not subject to the fanciful interpretations that accompa-
ny illusive terms such as “reasonable fear of political persecu-
tion.” 
2. A Clearly Defined Role for Diplomatic Asylum 
In defining the standard for diplomatic asylum, the ICJ 
should proceed with various goals in mind. First, the Court 
                                                                                                             
 171. See Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12, art. 9 (“[t]he 
official furnishing asylum shall take into account the information furnished 
to him by the territorial government in forming his judgment as to the nature 
of the offense or the existence of related common crimes”). Although the pre-
cise usage patterns amongst OAS members remain unknown, the absence of 
any recent dispute that has garnered international attention appears to indi-
cate that the concept is widely accepted and rarely challenged, or at least 
resolved amicably between the interested nations. 
 172. The Court itself acknowledged that the two parties’ arguments “re-
veal[ed] a confusion between territorial asylum (extradition), on the one 
hand, and diplomatic asylum, on the other.” Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 274. 
 173. From the Havana Convention, the ICJ held that diplomatic asylum 
“can be granted only to political offenders who are not accused or condemned 
for common crimes and only in urgent cases and for the time strictly indis-
pensable for the safety of the refugee.” Id. at 278. 
 174. In determining that Haya de la Torre’s case was not of an “urgent 
character,” the Court did not establish a helpful standard for future use, but 
implied that the determination was almost entirely contextual. Id. at 283–87. 
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should firmly establish the scope of diplomatic asylum within 
international human rights law.175 In an effort to monitor its 
use, the ICJ should recognize diplomatic asylum as a subset of 
political asylum within customary international law.176 A sig-
nificant reason behind the international failure to regulate dip-
lomatic asylum is the divergent paths that were taken after 
Asylum Case.177 By broadening the applicability of diplomatic 
asylum law, the ICJ would thereby eliminate disputes about 
what constitutes “international custom,” defined by the Court 
“as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”178  This 
would preclude the Court from engaging in fact-intensive in-
vestigations of past use, such as whether diplomatic asylum is 
a part of U.S. custom as a result of its sporadic but infamous 
use of the right over the past century.179 The expanded scope of 
                                                                                                             
 175. Within pieces of recognized international law, the formal international 
stance on the incident is that diplomatic asylum is not officially recognized by 
most countries. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 155 (ar-
guing that diplomatic asylum “had not been accepted by the majority of Eu-
ropean States, and by the United Kingdom Government in particular”). How-
ever this dispute, along with the prevalence of diplomatic asylum in Latin 
America, and notable instances of use by the United States over the past fifty 
years, has certainly raised questions as to how nations view diplomatic asy-
lum unofficially. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 28 (listing three cases where 
the United States granted asylum to those who sought refuge in its diplomat-
ic missions). 
 176. In retaining the right to differentiate between political and diplomatic 
asylum, the ICJ should determine that the broad protection offered by Article 
14 of the UDHR only applies in cases of political asylum, so as to not restrict 
human rights any more than necessary. Article 14(1) of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” See UDHR, supra note 11. 
 177. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 (discussing 
how a system had developed amongst Latin American countries whereby ad 
hoc administration of diplomatic asylum had become sufficiently prominent 
so as to become an important part of regional human rights law, while the 
right had all but ceased to be granted in all other parts of the world). 
 178. ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 38(1)(b). The Haya de la Torre case 
demonstrates that even evidence of past practice does not necessarily signify 
the existence of custom in a specific country. See Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 
I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (holding that the evidence failed to demonstrate that 
the right of diplomatic asylum existed as custom in Colombia). 
 179. See Austermuhle, supra note 100 (recalling the infamous U.S. diplo-
matic asylum case involving József Mindszenty); Greene, supra note 28 (cit-
ing to an article discussing key international precedents involving diplomatic 
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diplomatic asylum would also result in each U.N. member be-
ing bound by the same terms, so as to enable each nation to tai-
lor its other international responsibilities around a uniform 
principle of diplomatic asylum. 
Having addressed to whom diplomatic asylum will apply, the 
Court should then move on to its most important role: estab-
lishing the requisite conditions for when diplomatic asylum 
may be granted. As it currently stands, the OAS Convention on 
Diplomatic Asylum provides that nations have wide discretion 
in situations where diplomatic asylum is available.180 The only 
qualification to this unfettered discretion appears to be that 
there must be a good faith effort by a nation to “take into ac-
count the information furnished to [it] by the territorial gov-
ernment in forming [its] judgment as to the nature of the of-
fence or the existence of related common crimes.”181 The expan-
sive language of the UDHR provides no further instruction as 
to when asylum should be granted.182 The absence of a tem-
                                                                                                             
asylum). In February 2012, the United States notably chose not to grant dip-
lomatic asylum to Wang Lijun. Wang Lijun ended the rein of Chongqing 
Communist Party Chief, Bo Xilai, due in large part to “his role in a widening 
political scandal inside China.” Jay Solomon & Devlin Barrett, U.S. Saw Top 
Cop as Risky Asylum Candidate, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303459004577362360212353
368.html. 
 180. Article IV of the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum provides that 
“[i]t shall rest with the State granting asylum to determine the nature of the 
offense or the motives for the persecution.” Convention on Diplomatic Asy-
lum, supra note 12, art. 4. 
 181. Id. art. 9. In this regard, however, the Dominican Republic did make a 
reservation to the applicability of diplomatic asylum in certain situations, 
specifically “to any controversies that may arise between the territorial State 
and the State granting asylum, that refer specifically to the absence of a seri-
ous situation or the non-existence of a true act of persecution against the 
asylee by the local authorities.” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General 
Information, supra note 12. 
 182. Article 14 provides only that “everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra note 11. Article II of the OAS Convention on Diplomat-
ic Asylum additionally provides that “[e]very State has the right to grant asy-
lum; but it is not obligated to do so or to state its reasons for refusing it.” 
Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12, art. 2. However, Guatema-
la and Uruguay both made reservations to this provision, arguing that states 
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poral element may have symbolized an effort to allow countries 
to make subjective determinations in constantly evolving polit-
ical times.183 
A specific standard for when diplomatic asylum applies 
should first seek to place a time limit on the duration of a grant 
of diplomatic asylum. The lack of a fixed duration has proven 
problematic for both OAS nations and the United States.184 
Although the United States does not depart from its stated pol-
icy against diplomatic asylum, the instances in which the Unit-
ed States has granted diplomatic asylum have signaled its will-
ingness to allow asylees to remain in U.S. missions for long pe-
riods of time.185 While cooperation amongst OAS nations has 
generally facilitated this process, Latin America has encoun-
tered difficulties with regard to extended grants of diplomatic 
asylum.186 
An established duration would reflect a compromise between 
the complete elimination of diplomatic asylum and the OAS’ 
                                                                                                             
did have an affirmative obligation to grant asylum in certain circumstances. 
Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, supra note 12. 
 183. The decision to institute such expansive language may similarly reflect 
an effort to allow the U.N. flexibility to determine the validity of individual 
asylum cases, rather than risk the possibility of individual nations infringing 
on human rights. This possibility is supported by the creation of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was established in 1950 to 
“lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve ref-
ugee problems worldwide.” About Us, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
 184. See generally Angela Rossitto, Diplomatic Asylum in the United States 
and Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 13 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 118–
27, 130–34 (1987) (providing “analysis of the limited United States practice of 
granting asylum” and of “controversial events . . . that demonstrate the ways 
in which Latin America’s rather liberal policy has proven to be problematic”). 
 185. See id. at 118–20. Although the Soviets did not appreciate that the 
United States had granted diplomatic asylum to Mindszenty, the United 
States was similarly upset that the ordeal lasted fifteen years. Id. Seven Rus-
sian Pentecostal dissidents remained in the U.S. embassy in Russia for more 
than three years. Id. at 120–21. 
 186. See id. at 130–31. Safe-conducts were provided to military prisoners 
after approximately five months in the Peruvian embassy in Caracas, Vene-
zuela. Id. Haya de la Torre remained in the Colombian embassy in Lima from 
1949 to 1954, before he was permitted to leave. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
257669/Victor-Raul-Haya-de-la-Torre (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
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standard “for the time strictly indispensable for the safety of 
the refugee.”187 Such broad language places exclusive reliance 
on a negotiated solution, since it is difficult to imagine a sce-
nario in which the “safety of a refugee” is ensured without an 
amicable resolution between parties.188 Thus, a short duration 
permits both parties sufficient time to engage in good faith ef-
forts to reach a negotiated solution before the parties become 
subject to consequences that accompany a failure to reach a 
mutually agreed upon resolution.189 
Conflicts without an established date for resolution also raise 
the important question of how diplomatic asylum should be 
terminated if no amicable resolution is reached between the 
parties. This is the precise issue that the ICJ considered in its 
Haya de la Torre judgment when the ICJ refused to compel 
Haya de la Torre’s surrender to Peru because such an action 
would reward Peru with custody of Haya de la Torre.190 The 
consequences of failing to come to an agreement prior to the 
expiration of the six-month duration of asylum that should be 
implemented in all future cases of diplomatic asylum should 
have repercussions that both parties will acknowledge as legit-
imate, but only to the extent that it encourages good faith ne-
gotiation.191 
                                                                                                             
 187. Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 278 (Nov. 20). This language 
was later changed to “the period of time strictly necessary for the asylee to 
depart from the country with the guarantees granted by the Government of 
the territorial state . . . .” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12, 
art. 5. 
 188. Such reliance lends credence to Ecuador’s refusal to budge on its 
stance, as the de facto position permits them to keep Assange indefinitely. 
See supra note 130 (stating Ecuador’s willingness to allow Assange to remain 
in its embassy for “two centuries” if necessary). 
 189. While a fixed duration would not necessarily encourage an expeditious 
result, it would give both parties ample opportunity to explore various ave-
nues for a settlement. It also shows that diplomatic asylum cases are often 
illustrative of larger political differences that take time to resolve. 
 190. Haya de la Torre Case (Colom./Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 81–82 (June 13). 
The court inexplicably provided no further guidance as to how Haya de la 
Torre’s asylum should be terminated, alleging that such advice would require 
the Court to “depart from its judicial function.” Id. at 83. 
 191. As it currently stands, whether a party is willing to make a good faith 
effort in negotiation is affected by the strength of its bargaining position. See 
supra note 185 (arguing that Ecuador has the superior bargaining position at 
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The ICJ should thus mandate that all unresolved disputes be 
referred to an independent international body that would defin-
itively rule on the validity of a diplomatic asylum case. Since 
the primary purpose of such an international body would be to 
encourage a negotiated resolution and discourage the pursuit of 
independent judicial review, this review body would ideally be 
the creation of an organization that deals with human rights 
cases, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (“UNHCR”).192 For parties that do not want to face the 
uncertainty that accompanies a judicial proceeding, a negotiat-
ed settlement within the fixed time period provides the only 
alternative. 
When the independent tribunal is called upon to resolve a 
diplomatic asylum dispute, it is important that a specific legal 
standard is applied to the individuals that have been granted 
asylum. First, the tribunal should defer to the penal system in 
the nation bringing the charges in determining whether the 
aslyee is sought for a “common crime.”193 The tribunal’s inter-
pretation of this term provides a safeguard to ensure that poor 
foreign relations between nations will not impact whether spe-
cific misconduct is classified as a “common crime.” Next, the 
tribunal should make the conclusive determination whether 
the asylee faces a “reasonable fear of political persecution.” It is 
only at this point that the tribunal will determine which of two 
courses of action is appropriate: surrender the party to the na-
tion seeking prosecution, or recognize the party’s permanent 
political asylee status and allow for safe passage into the na-
tion that has granted diplomatic asylum.194 
                                                                                                             
this point because the de facto position is that Assange remains in its embas-
sy, and history has demonstrated that such standoffs can last for long periods 
of time). 
 192. Judicial review led by the UNHCR would be ideal, not only for 
UNHCR’s history of dealing with asylum and refugees, but also because its 
authority is granted by the U.N. About Us, supra note 180. 
 193. See Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 278 (Nov. 20) (holding that, 
under the Havana Convention, diplomatic asylum “can be granted only to 
political offenders who are not accused or condemned for common crimes . . 
.”). 
 194. The importance of the only two potential outcomes is that both out-
comes present a natural conclusion to the temporary status of diplomatic asy-
lum, which should be the primary goal. 
2014] DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM 485 
While this proposed proceeding is assuredly a fact-intensive 
determination that rests upon the subjective determination of a 
third party, it only comes at the end of a process that has pre-
sented numerous opportunities for both sides to resolve the 
dispute amicably without judicial interference. Further, the 
subjective determination is entrusted to a judicial body intrin-
sically qualified to make determinations on sensitive human 
rights matters in an efficient manner that reflects the magni-
tude of the proceedings.195 A judicial body that has adhered to 
the process outlined above will offer substantial clarity to a 
system that has led some to question whether diplomatic asy-
lum is recognized by international law. 
CONCLUSION 
Julian Assange’s stay in the Ecuadorean embassy has pro-
vided the international community an opportunity to address 
an area of law that has needed clarification since it was first 
recognized more than sixty years ago.196 As the role of asylum 
law has changed in conjunction with increased international 
interest in human rights, the uncertainty surrounding the 
right of diplomatic asylum has been largely disregarded in fa-
vor of guaranteeing widespread protection from persecution.197 
The result has been nearly unfettered limits to a principle that 
has grown within the right of political asylum, providing pro-
                                                                                                             
 195. The ability to make such determinations in a competent manner is 
perhaps the most important role of this independent tribunal, since such ex-
pertise has a significant impact on the parties’ willingness to resolve their 
dispute in front of this judicial body. 
 196. Although the right of asylum draws aspects from various pieces of law, 
the Asylum Case and Haya de la Torre decisions and the OAS Convention on 
Diplomatic Asylum provide the necessary foundation for diplomatic asylum 
law. See supra notes 12 (stating that the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asy-
lum provides the framework for how diplomatic asylum will be administered 
amongst parties to the treaty), 69 (Asylum Case addressed whether diplomat-
ic asylum was recognized by international law, while the Haya de la Torre 
case centered upon whether Colombia was compelled to surrender Haya de la 
Torre to the Peruvian government). 
 197. This increased interest in human rights is perhaps best illustrated by 
the history of the UNHCR. This organization has grown from thirty-four staff 
members in 1954, to more than 7,000 members in 2012, and has been award-
ed two Nobel Peace Prizes, most recently in 1981 for “worldwide assistance 
[of] refugees.” About Us, supra note 180. 
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tection within diplomatic premises to individuals fleeing perse-
cution by sovereign nations. 
While the availability of political asylum is an important tool 
in the protection of human rights on a global scale, definitive 
limits must be placed on a tool with such expansive reach. Ge-
opolitical differences have allowed definitions of asylum to di-
verge, resulting in the growth of diplomatic asylum in Latin 
America.198 Notably, this unprecedented growth has seemingly 
coincided with an increased lack of acceptance of diplomatic 
asylum amongst most other countries. The Assange dispute 
has demonstrated that separate treatment for political refugees 
based on their geographic location can result in contentious 
disputes that extend beyond the question of human rights. As 
the supreme international organization, the U.N. should not 
allow the Assange dispute to dissipate before definitively 
providing a binding international standard on the permissibil-
ity of the concept of diplomatic asylum. Failure to take such 
decisive action may have drastic consequences for the future, 
when additional disputes over the right of diplomatic asylum 
under an imprecise standard could have a disastrous effect on 
foreign relations. 
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 198. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 12 (noting famous 
instances where diplomatic asylum had been granted in Latin America from 
1850 to 1891). 
* B.A., Boston College (2008); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (expected 2014); 
Executive Articles Editor of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
(2013–2014). Thank you to the staff and editors of the Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law for all of their assistance in the preparation and publica-
tion of this Note. Thank you also to my family and friends who remained pa-
tient and supportive throughout the process. Finally, I would like to thank 
my parents, John Lavander and Nancy Owen, for their steadfast love, sup-
port, and encouragement throughout my academic career. All errors or omis-
sions are my own. 
